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NOTES
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND INTERSTATE CARRIERS
In 1957, Marlon Green, a former United States Air Force pilot and
a Negro, filed an application for employment with Continental Air Lines,
an interstate corporation whose flight operations extend to eight states.
Green was tested and interviewed but not hired.' He filed a complaint
with the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission and, after a hearing,
the Commission found that Continental Air Lines had violated the Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1957.2 Finding that Green was the best qualified
applicant,3 the Commission ordered the airline to enroll him in their
training school.' On appeal, the Commission's order was reversed and
the complaint dismissed. The trial judge held that the application of the
fair employment act to interstate carriers resulted in a substantial burden
on commerce and that the area had been preempted by congressional
action and executive orders. This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Colorado which held that the Commission has no jurisdiction
over employers engaged in interstate commerce. The Commission has
indicated that it will appeal to the United States Supreme Court.'
Although the federal government has taken the initiative in the
area of civil rights, it has not acted significantly with respect to employ-
ment discrimination. State and municipal governments, however, have
accepted this responsibility and have created agencies to deal with the
problem. To date, twenty-four northern and western states have enacted
legislation aimed at employment discrimination.6
1. Green was interviewed with fourteen other applicants and was one of six found
to be qualified. The other five applicants were selected by Continental Air Lines to
enter its training program.
2. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-24-1-80-24-8 (Supp. 1957).
3. The Commission found that Continental had violated the Anti-Discrimination
Act, (1) by refusing to employ Green as a pilot because he was a negro, (2) by failing
to advise the applicant as to the action taken on his employment application and (3) by
requiring an applicant to submit a photograph and an indication of his race.
4. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 143 Colo. 590,
355 P.2d 83 (1960).
5. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 30 U.S.L. Week
1141 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1962) ; Denver Post, Mar. 13, 1962, p. 1.
6. ALASKA Comr. LAws ANN. §§ 43-5-1-43-5-10 (Supp. 1958); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 23-371-23-375 (1956); CAL. LAD. CODE §§ 1410-1432 (Supp. 1961) ; CoLo.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-24-1-8 (Supp. 1957). CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 31-122-31-
128 (1958) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 §§ 710-713 (Supp. 1960) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 19
§§ 17-24 (Smith-Hurd 1935), ch. 19 §§ 24a-24g (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 40-2307--40-2317 (Bums Supp. 1961); Iowa Senate Concurrent Resolution,
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New York enacted the first fair employment act in 1945, creating a
model State Commission Against Discrimination.' The New York
legislation has served as the pattern for the comprehensive codes contain-
ing enforcement procedure' and aimed at employment discrimination.
The Indiana statute is a comprehensive code but it relies solely upon
persuasion and education rather than a specific enforcement procedure.'
Other statutes are very narrow, applying only to certain fields, such as
public works and state employment. For example, the Iowa fair employ-
ment policy consists of a Senate Resolution expressing that state legisla-
ture's disapproval of discrimination.1"
Congress has not enacted a fair employment act though attempts to
do so began as early as 1942." All federal disapproval of employment
discrimination has been expressed by the president through his executive
powers, free from congressional interference. Shortly before America's
entry into World War II, President Roosevelt created the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Committee. 2 The committee was authorized to investigate
complaints originating from employment discrimination but was not
empowered to rectify abuses. In order to maximize America's war effort,
President Roosevelt took the most extensive action in this field to date.
He authorized the Fair Employment Practices Committee to investigate
charges of discrimination occurring in occupations essential to the war
effort and ordered that all government contracts contain a clause pro-
hibiting employment discrimination."
April 25, 1955, CCH LAD. L. REP., 1 State Laws § 47,500; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-1001--44-1008 (Supp. 1957); IvAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151 §§ 1-10 (1957); Micr.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17.458(1)-17.458(11) (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-363.13(1957); NED. REv. STAT. §§ 48.215-48.216 (Reissue 1960); NEv. R V. STAT. § 338.125(1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-1-18:25-28 (Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
59-4-1-59-4-14 (1953) ; N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §§ 290-301 (1951) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§§ 4112.02-4112.99 (Page Supp. 1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 659.010-659.990 (1961);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 951-963 (Supp. 1961); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1-
28-5-39 (1956); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.040-49.60.230 (Supp. 1959); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 111.31-11.36 (Supp. 1961).
7. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW §§ 290-301 (1951).
8. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Washington, Wisconsin.
9. See Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Experi-
ence Under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 40 (1954),
for a discussion of the New York commission's use of persuasion.
10. See Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW. 443 (1960), for an excellent discussion of the
state fair employment laws and Note, 74 HARv. L. REV. 526 (1961) for a good discussion
of the operation of the state anti-discrimination commissions.
11. Since 1942, Congress has attempted to enact a fair employment law in every
congressional session but such attempts have failed for lack of effective party support.
12. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
13. Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
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Shortly after becoming president, Harry S. Truman extended the
life of F.E.P.C.'4 but he rendered the committee powerless by negating
its enforcement authority. The executive order procluded the committee
from isuing cease and desist orders and within a year after the war
the committee was disbanded. No further executive action was taken
against employment discrimination until the election year of 1948.
Following the Democratic convention, the president ordered personnel
officers in the government to make all appointments and promotions
solely on the basis of merit and ordered an end to discrimination based on
race, color, religion and national origin." President Truman created the
Committee on Government Contract Compliance in 1951, authorizing the
committee to scrutinize government contracts and to insure that dis-
crimination was eliminated in work performed under such contracts."
President Dwight D. Eisenhower revamped the federal system of
handling employment discrimination by transforming the contract com-
pliance committee into a study group.' Similarly, he created the Com-
mittee on Government Employment Policy in 1955 to reduce discrimina-
tion in federal employment.'
Soon after his inauguration, John F. Kennedy created the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and commissioned that
body to execute the policy of non-discrimination within the executive
branch of the government.'" The president reaffirmed the policy of non-
discrimination in government contracts and ordered the termination of
business with all contractors and sub-contractors who refused to adhere
to the anti-discrimination clause in their contracts.
The executive orders indicate a national interest in the problem of
employment discrimination. But, in the twenty years of presidential
activity in this field each chief executive has found it necessary to issue
orders concerning the same two subjects signifying a lack of success for
the federal program.
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the validity of state fair
employment laws. It has been the states' administrative policy to rely
upon persuasion for a solution to this problem and to keep such cases
out of court. They have been successful for there has been a dearth of
14. Exec. Order No. 9664, 10 Fed. Reg. 15301 (1945).
15. Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1948). President Truman created
the Fair Employment Board within the Civil Service Commission to review decisions
made by any department head in an effort to enforce the presidential order.
16. Exec. Order No. 10308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1951).
17. Exec. Order No. 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4641 (1953) establishing the President's
Committee on government contracts.
18. Exec. Order No. 10590, 20 Fed. Reg. 409 (1955).
19. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
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adjudication in this field. In the cases that have reached the courts, the
validity of state fair employment laws has been assumed on the basis of
the constitutionality of other civil rights legislation. However, the
decisions supporting the constitutionality of state civil rights laws have
been confined to the protection of members of the public seeking services
and not to laws prohibiting racial and religious considerations in indi-
vidual employment.2"
It is unquestionably within the police power of the states to enact
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in the use of facilities serving
a public function.' But in Hall v. DeCuir, the Supreme Court invalidated
the application of a discrimination ban to interstate carriers.2 The
Supreme Court of Colorado, in affirming the lower court's decision in
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air Lines,"
relied upon the eighty-five year old Hall decision. The basis for the
decision in Hall was that the contested Louisiana Anti-Discrimination
Statute conflicted with statutes in the neighboring ports serviced by
the carried which required segregation of the races. At that time segrega-
tion was a legally recognized institution, but this situation does not exist
today. A state statute expressing a policy contrary to that of the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act would not be respected today but would be
invalidated by the Supreme Court as a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
In Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 25 a New York statute pro-
hibiting discrimination in labor union membership was upheld as a
constitutional exercise of that state's police power. This opinion indicates
that the Court considers the Fourteenth Amendment to establish the
minimum standards, and that the Court favorably views state legislation
seeking to extend prohibitions against discrimination.2
20. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
21. Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926); Bayliss v. Curry, 128
IIl. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889) ; Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 12 Am. Rep. 375 (1873).
22. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
23. 30 U.S.L. WEEK 1141 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1962).
24. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
25. 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
26. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:[A] state may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice
to another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such
state power would stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by
individuals on their private prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations
like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction
than the determination of a state to extend the area of non-discrimination
beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts.
Id. at 90.
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There are three major issues involved in the application of state
fair employment laws to interstate carriers. First, it is necessary to
determine whether the state fair employment laws constitute a burden
on interstate commerce. Second, it is necessary to determine whether
the national government has occupied the field to the exclusion of the
states. Third, it must be considered whether there is an actual or potential
conflict between the fair employment laws and existing federal regula-
tions. The purpose of this note is to examine these issues and to consider
the constitutional problems involved in the application of fair employment
laws to interstate carriers.
The Supreme Court has consistently defined a burden on commerce
as those activities of a state which directly impair the usefulness of
facilities for such traffic." In the absence of preemptive legislation,
however, a state may regulate interstate commerce for the protection of
reasonable local interests if the regulation does not materially obstruct the
flow of commerce.28 A burden on commerce is, in effect, an illegal
embargo which will not be tolerated.2"
It may conceivably be argued that fair employment laws increase
operational costs, but a state regulation which merely increases the opera-
tional costs of interstate carriers is not a burden on commerce if it is
reasonable and can be justified by a valid state purpose." The Supreme
Court has upheld reasonable taxation of interstate carriers2" for the
purpose of defraying inspection and administrative costs.2 Rather than
increasing operational costs, however, the anti-discrimination laws are
potential cost decreasers. There is no requirement that any employer
hire a number of a minority group but only that he employ the most
qualified work force. This will inevitably reduce labor and repair costs.
27. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
28. Breard v. Alexander, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
29. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950)
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
30. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935).
31. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) ; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927).
32. The Supreme Court has upheld many state statutes affecting interstate com-
merce, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (state statute requiring vision and
color blindness tests for railroad employees); Morris v. Durby, 274 U.S. 135 (1927)
(Oregon weight restriction of motor carriers) ; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932)
(size and weight restrictions on trucks using Texas highways); South Carolina
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (restriction on size and weight
of motor carriers) ; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (Pennsylvania statute
forbidding the use of its highways to any vehicle carrying any other vehicle over the
head of the driver of the first vehicle) ; Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainman, 318 U.S.
1 (1943) (Illinois requirement that freight trains have cabooses) ; Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919) (statute requiring interstate carriers to provide local
service) ; Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911) (statute requiring
full crews) ; South Covington & C. R.R. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915) (statute
regulating the number of passengers and cars on railroad trains).
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The state fair employment laws are applicable to all employers
within the state, whether interstate or intrastate. They were enacted to
promote equal employment opportunities, not to discriminate against
interstate business within their jurisdiction. The fair employment laws
do not impose upon a carrier any burden which would make it more
difficult to compete with carriers operating in other states and they are
not invalid merely because another state, in the exercise of a similar
power, does not impose the regulation.3
State fair employment laws apply only to carriers using the state
as a base to recruit employees or as a principal place of business. A state
could not impose its regulation upon a carrier whose only contact with
the state is the use of its highways, railroad stations or airports. If mere
usage of state facilities required a carrier to conform to the state employ-
ment regulations, the carrier would have to observe the strictest fair
employment law. Indirectly, this would create a uniform national policy
thereby infringing upon the responsibility of the federal government.
Such application of the law would be unreasonable and constitute a
burden on commerce. It is not, however, the jurisdictional ground upon
which the states have enacted other employment regulations nor is it
the case with fair employment laws.
Notwithstanding the decision of the Colorado court in Colorado
Anti-Discrmination Commission v. Continental Air Lines, extension of
state fair employment legislation to interstate carriers should not, in itself,
constitute a burden on interstate commerce. The issuance of affirmative
orders as a remedial procedure, however, may be such an unreasonable
interference with the regulated business as to constitute a burden on
commerce. State commissions operating under comprehensive codes are
authorized to order the promotion, reinstatement or employment of spe-
cific individuals in cases where the employer has engaged in discrimina-
tory practices. Although the anti-discrimination commissions are charged
with the enforcement of legislative policy, they are, nevertheless, inade-
quately qualified to determine the best applicant for jobs requiring ad-
ministrative or technical qualifications. They are likely to be staffed
with local personnel chosen merely on the basis of geographical location
or membership in interested pressure groups and the variety of occupa-
tions subject to fair employment laws prevent the commissions from
specializing in the employment procedure of any single enterprise. This
consideration becomes less significant, however, with respect to occupa-
tions not demanding highly skilled and technical abilities.
33. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission ordered Continental
Air Lines to give Green an opportunity to enroll in its training program.
This was an interference with Continental's employment discretion be-
cause enrollment in the training program was tantamont to hiring him as
a pilot. Once a state dictates whom an employer must place in the cockpit
of an airplane, it has greatly affected interstate commerce. The com-
mission, in determining Green's qualifications, exercised jurisdiction over
a subject demanding greater technical knowledge than it possessed.
Furthermore, in a business where the lives of so many people depend
upon the competence of the employees, the employer's discretion in hiring
is essential and an affirmative order, which does not take account of
intangible factors, may amount to a severe burden on commerce.
What may not be done in one way, however, may be accomplished
in another. Issuance of affirmative orders does not constitute the sole
remedial process. The commission may discharge its statutory responsi-
bility by issuing a cease and desist order, specifically restraining the
offender from discriminating in future hiring. Such orders do not be-
come effective until approved and issued by a court whereupon they be-
come enforceable by contempt proceedings.34 In states where the anti-
discrimination laws are more than mere policy utterances, the commissions
possess follow-up authority to insure that the employer does not resume
his discriminatory practices. Pursuant to this authority, the commission
can investigate later employment practices and determine whether the
employer has complied with the court order. In the event that Continental
Air Lines should continue to require the submission of a photograph or
an indication of race with an employment application, it would not only
violate the fair employment law but would also be in contempt of the
enjoining order. The burden would be upon Continental to explain its
actions to the court if once again Green is rejected when he ostensibly
satisfies the airline's employment qualifications. Such a remedial scheme
does not unreasonably usurp the employer's hiring discretion yet it
guarantees future compliance with the fair employment laws. Subject to
the sole admonition to avoid discrimination, an employer is completely
free to exercise his own judgment on the qualifications of applicants.
A negative order may not be as direct as an affirmative order in effectuat-
ing the statute but its virtue lies in the avoidance of constitutional
problems.
In the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission case, the trial
judge held that the state was preempted from applying its fair employ-
34. Dal Maso v. Bd. of Com'rs of Prince George's County, 182 Md. 200, 34 A.2d
464 (1943).
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ment act to interstate carriers because the national government had
occupied the field. The court specifically relied upon the Railway Labor
Act3" and presidential executive orders as a ground of federal preemption.
The Railway Labor Act does prohibit certain types of discrimination
but it has never been applied to cases of employment discrimination where
the employer has refused to hire a particular applicant for reasons of race
or religion. The act has been primarily enforced to prevent union dis-
crimination against non-members36 and the Supreme Court has required
majority unions to represent all members of the bargaining unit, regard-
less of their union affiliation." In Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Rail-
way Co.,3" the majority union, which barred negroes from membership,
entered into a contract with the railroad discriminating against negro fire-
men. The court held that the contract was illegal and enjoined the
carrier from fulfilling the contract because it could not benefit from
an agreement which the union was prohibiting from making. The court
failed to find a statutory prohibition against employer discrimination
but based its injunction on a condemnation of the union's conduct.
The Federal Aviation Act enjoins air carriers from causing "any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
port, [or] locality . . . or to subject any particular person . . . to any
unjust discrimination or any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever.""9  This statutory duty has been applied to
freight handling and passenger service, but never to employment dis-
crimination."0
The prohibitions against discrimination in the Federal Aviation Act
and the Interstate Commerce Act are not broad enough to include employ-
ment discrimination. The limitation is contained in the phrase "person,
port, locality, or description of traffic. . . ." These are descriptive
terms of classes affected by, or enjoyng, the services of the carrier.
Applying the rule of ejusdern generis, this is the only thing they have
in common and the only reason for them to be grouped together. It
35. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958), made applicable to air carriers
by 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1958).
36. Steele v. L. & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
37. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 332
(1949); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
38. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
39. 72 Stat. 763 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (Supp. 1961); identical prohibition
in Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1958).
40. Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
The same provision is in the Interstate Commerce act. See Henderson v. United States,
339 U.S. 816 (1950) and Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
497
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would require a strained reading to interpret the statute as applying to
cases of employment discrimination.
The fact that the federal government has regulated some phases of
interstate transportation, and even some phases of carrier employment,
does not exclude state regulation. There is no sharp distinction between
national and state regulation of interstate commerce. Of course, once
Congress has acted on a problem and has evinced an intention to occupy
the field, state regulation is prohibited.4' The Court is solicitous of state
regulations enacted under the reserved police power but the mere labeling
of a regulation as a police power will not save it in an area completely
occupied by the federal government.4 "
State regulations will not be invalidated if the state can show that
they are the expression of a reasonable concern, that they do not conflict
with a national law, that they do not establish a standard lower than
that fixed by Congress and that Congress has not expressed a desire
for exclusive occupation of the field.4"
In Kelly v. Washington,4 the Supreme Court upheld a state in-
spection requirement of tugboat hulls and machinery even though federal
agencies were authorized to inspect other parts of the tug. Congress
must clearly manifest an intention to preclude reasonable state regulation
in order to constitute federal preemption." That intent will not be
inferred merely because Congress has entered the field. There is no
indication, from existing federal law, of congressional intent to pre-
empt the application of state fair employment laws to interstate carriers.
In the absence of preemptive intent, the opponent of a state law must
clearly show that its provisions are inconsistent with national law in order
to avoid the state regulation.47 There is no conflict between the state
fair employment laws and federal policy. The executive orders of Presi-
dents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy indicate that the
federal policy and the state fair employment laws do not conflict, but
are born of a common goal.
Presidential executive orders, applicable through government con-
tracts, constitute the only federal law regulating discriminatory hiring
41. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
42. Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1951).
43. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) ; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber,
169 U.S. 613 (1898) ; Deveau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) ; California v. Zook, 336
U.S. 725 (1949) ; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
44. 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
45. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
46. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412 (1914).
47. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
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practices.4" Executive orders have the force and effect of statutes and
are a part of the law of the land. Thus if the statutory duty to carry
mail is comparable to having a government contract, all of the airlines
are subject to the presidential prohibitions against discrimination. 9 This
would still not preclude similar state action. There is no conflict between
the fair employment laws and executive orders0 nor was there any mani-
festation of intent on the part of the chief executives to exclude similar
state regulation."
There is no conflict between the state fair employment laws and the
federal regulation of interstate carriers because they work in separate
areas. There has been no congressional regulation of carrier employment
discrimination. Congress' concern 'with the employment policy has been
limited to regulations for safety.
Authorized by Congress to license pilots and other airline employees,
the Federal Aviation Agency has promulgated extensive requirements
for certification. 12  F.A.A. standards cover the gamut from health, 3
age, 4 moral character," ability to read and write English,"8 schooling,"7
to aeronautical knowledge 8 and skill," but do not bar discrimination by
the carrier. It is plausible to read into these rigid standards an implied
requirement that the airlines employ the best qualified pilots. The state
fair employment laws are consistent with this policy because they insure
that the best qualified applicant will not be rejected because of race,
religion or national origin. These laws do not narrow the carrier's
choice of employees but broaden his base of recruitment to the entire
community, thereby insuring the employment of the most qualified
persons.
If Congress enacts a fair employment law, state regulations which
do not equal the federal standard must yield, but absent preemptive intent
48. The airlines have a statutory duty to carry mail. 72 Stat. 764 (1958), 49
U.S.C. 1375 (Supp. 1961). The post office department determines when and where
the mail will be carried.
49. Judge William Black, in the Denver court, held that Continental Air Lines was
covered by Executive Orders No. 10590, supra note 18 and No. 10925, supra note 19
because Continental held government contracts to carry the mail. This finding was
erroneous. Continental has not contracted to carry the mail but is under a statutory
duty to do so.
50. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
51. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
52. 14 C.F.R. §§ 20-22A5 (1961).
53. 14 C.F.R. § 29 (1961).
54. 14 C.F.R. § 21.10 (1961).
55. 14 C.F.R. § 21.11 (1961).
56. 14 C.F.R. § 1.13 (1961).
57. Ibid.
58. 14 C.F.R. § 21.15 (1961).
59. 14 C.F.R. § 21.16-1 (1961).
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state laws equaling the federal standard or exceeding it will survive. °
The states might possibly attempt to expand the fair employment
laws by requiring employers to hire on a quota system to make their
labor force representative of the population. This would be invalidated
by the Supreme Court, however, as a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. A quota system, which was instituted to protect the employment
opportunities of American citizens in Arizona at the expense of the
foreign born minority, was invalidated by the court in Truax v. Rqich."
While the equal protection clause was invoked in the Truax case to
protect the rights of minority groups, they do not have a monopoly on
the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. State enforced
quota systems are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment whether they
infringe upon minority or majority rights.
The quota system of employment would also conflict with the
F.A.A.'s implied directive to air carriers to employ the best qualified
applicants. An employer, filling the state quota requirements, could not
rely solely upon the ability of his applicants. Rather than effectuating
the fair employment laws, it would obstruct their operation because the
goal of the anti-discrimination laws' is to insure equal opportunity for all
citizens based on ability and to eliminate the racial or ethnic consideration
in the selection of employees. A statute requiring a percentage of em-
polyees to be selected from minority groups would reintroduce the racial
and ethnic factors to a degree previously unknown and would require
the employer to keep records of the race, religion and color of his
employees. This would entirely defeat the spirit of the laws.
States providing an enforcement procedure authorize the anti-
discrimination commissions to issue affirmative orders. An affirmative
order is the last resort, issued only after an extensive hearing and when
all conciliatory attempts have failed. The affirmative order has proven
to be an effective method for enforcing the anti-discrimination laws
against intrastate business and this procedure has been upheld by the
courts.62 The criminal peinalties provided by the fair employment statutes,
however, have been found to be too harsh and have never been imposed.
Without the power inherent in the affirmative order, compliance with
the law would be totally dependent upon the offending employer and the
fair employment laws would be ineffective. But affirmative orders
present the greatest opportunity for conflict between a state fair em-
ployment law and federal law. Not only is the application of an af firma-
60. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
61. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
62. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d (1954).
NOTES
tive order to interstate carriers a burden on commerce, it also presents
a potential conflict with federal safety regulations.
For example, when a commission orders an employer to hire a
specific applicant, if the qualifications for that job have been established
by a federal agency, the employer may have to choose between being in
contempt of the commission's order or violating the federal standards.
When the Colorado commission ordered Continental Air Lines to employ
Green he may have been the most qualified applicant but his qualifications
may be suspect when the time for actual hiring arrives. If Green were no
longer the best qualified applicant, compliance with the commission's
order would be a violation of the F.A.A. directive to employ the best
qualified applicants in airline positions.
Just as the application of the anti-discrimination acts need not con-
stitute a burden on commerce, their potential conflict with federal regula-
tions can also be avoided. A negative order directing the offending
employer not to discriminate presents no such conflict because it leaves
the actual employment decision to the employer. Thus if the federal
standards are to be violated the responsibility lies with the employer and
is not the result of a commission directive. The commission should then
follow up its order to insure that the employer does not perpetuate his
discriminatory hiring practices.
The decision now rests with the Supreme Court. The ruling of the
Colorado court frees interstate businesses from state fair employment
regulations. If the Colorado decision is sustained the only prohibition
against interstate employment discrimination will be the executive orders
which, at present, only apply to governemnt contractors. The easiest
solution to this problem would be the adoption of a federal prohibition
against interstate employment discrimination, either through congres-
sional extension of existing legislation or a sweeping executive order.
Neither approach, however, appears likely in the near future though
the need for fair employment regulation is apparent and has been met at
the state level with varying degrees of success.
The difficulty has arisen where the states have attempted to fill
the vacuum created by the absence of a federal prohibition of interstate
employment discrimination. There is no existing conflict, however, be-
tween the state fair employment laws and federal law, nor does the
extension of these laws to interstate carriers constitute a burden on com-
merce. The potential burden and conflict exist in the manner in which
these laws are administered. It has been shown that this may be remedied
by the issuance of cease and desist orders demanding an end to employ-
ment discrimination. This will effectuate the policy of the fair em-
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ployment laws without creating a burden on commerce or a conflict with
federal standards and will provide a constitutional application of these
laws to interstate carriers.
A TREND TOWARD STRENGTHENING ANTITRUST
SANCTIONS
Antitrust laws are normally enforced through sanctions imposed
in criminal prosecutions and civil treble damage actions.1 The burden
of deterring antitrust violations, however, seems to rest more on the
civil action instituted by private individuals than on the penal sanctions
of the antitrust laws.
In the civil action the plaintiff's problem lies in the obstacles which
must be overcome in proving (1) that there was a violation of the anti-
trust law,2 (2) that the plaintiff was injured in his "business or prop-
erty"' and (3) that the violation was the cause of the injury.' A review
of cases involving actions for treble damages reveals a tendency to lessen
the burdens in establishing the grounds for recovery of damages, thereby
providing a more effective sanction against violators. Although a majority
of the courts hold that the remedy provided by the Clayton Act is merely
compensatory,5 it is clear that the courts are aware of the deterrent affect
of trebling a "compensatory" award.'
In view of various problems created by the use of private civil actions
as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws, legislative attention has
recently been directed toward bringing up to date the penal sanctions of
the antitrust laws in order to make them more effective. This note will
demonstrate that the courts have decreased the burdens that a plaintiff
1. See OPPENHEim, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS CASES AND COMIENTS, 22-25 (2
Ed. 1959) for a general discussion of other remedies available under the antitrust laws.
2. See Comment, 18 U. Cxi. L. REv. 130 (1950) for a discussion of the obstacles
to the treble damage action.
3. Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Coal Co., 72 F.2d 885, 887 (4th Cir. 1934). "In a
civil suit under this section, the gist of the action is not merely the unlawful conspiracy
or . . . attempt to monopolize . . . but is damage to the individual plaintiff resulting
proximately from the acts of the defendant which constitutes a violation."
4. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944).
5. Karseal-Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Paramount
Films Dist. Co. v. Applebaum, 217 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1954); Wolf Sales Co. v.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Colo. 1952).
6. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957). The court stated
that the private treble damage action was an important means in helping to combat unlaw-
ful business practices. See also, Franchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp.
84 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
